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Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

William H. Babbel, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Jan Graham and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Billings (Law & Motion).
PER CURIAM:
William H. Babbel, appeals from the trial court's denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Babbel was convicted, after a trial by jury, of two counts
of aggravated sexual assault, and one count of aggravated
kidnapping. Babbel was sentenced to a term of five years to life
for the first count of aggravated assault, a concurrent term of
five years to life for the aggravated kidnapping, and a
consecutive term of five years to life for the second count of
aggravated sexual assault. Babbel appealed the convictions,
claiming the trial court should have excluded evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant because the warrant was issued without
probable cause. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the convictions
but ruled that sentencing was improper and remanded for
resentencing. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989).
On remand, the court resentenced petitioner to three concurrent
minimum mandatory terms of ten years to life. On appeal the
sentences were affirmed.
In January of 1991, Babbel filed his first petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming counsel failed to inform him that
the supreme court could vacate the sentence and allow the trial

As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus is not a
substitute for and cannot be used to perform the function of
regular appellate review, Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101,
1104 (Utah 1983). However, a conviction may nevertheless be
challenged by collateral attack in unusual circumstances or upon
a showing of good cause shown.1. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P. 2d 1029,
1035 (Utah 1989). "The unusual circumstances test was intended
to assure fundamental fairness and to require reexamination of a
conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged error
was such that it would be 'unconscionable not to reexamine' . . .
and thereby to assure that 'substantial justice [was] done'
. . . ." Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1115 (quoting Martinez v. Smith,
602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). Further, lf[t]he prior
adjudication of a habeas petition does not bar the adjudication
of a subsequent petition as a matter of res judicata, but Rule
65B(i)(4) does require a showing of good cause for filing a
successive writ.11 id. at 1036-37. "Frivolous claims, oncelitigated claims with no showing of unusual circumstances or good
cause, and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should
be summarily denied. In a successive petition, the burden is on
the petitioner "to show that the ends of justice would be served
by permitting the redetermination of the ground." Id.
Babbel essentially claims that his petition should not have
been dismissed as successive because there are "unusual
circumstances." Specifically, Babbel claims that the following
constitute unusual circumstances: the conviction was obtained
through the use of illegally seized evidence, Officer Cazier
obtained the warrant illegally, Officer Cazier committed perjury
to obtain the search warrant and to get evidence admitted, trial
counsel was ineffective, and appellate counsel was ineffective.
We first consider whether the allegation that the conviction
was obtained through the use of illegally seized evidence
constitutes "unusual circumstances." The Utah Supreme Court
addressed Babbel's claim regarding whether the evidence should
have been suppressed in his first appeal and concluded that the
trial court was justified in denying the motion to suppress.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989). Babbel has not shown good
cause or unusual circumstances that warrant reconsideration of
that issue.
Babbel also claims he was unable to raise certain claims in
his first petition because he did not have the transcripts and
documents to prove the claims. Specifically, he did not have the
documents to prove that Officer Ca-zier obtained the warrant
1. The Utah Supreme Court has not clarified whether unusual
circumstances and good cause are synonymous. However, one
justice has stated that the terms are comparable. Dunn v. Cook,
791 P.2d 873, 879 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BABBEL, WILLIAM H
PLAINTIFF
VS
HOLDEN, M TAMARA

CASE NUMBER 920903226 HC
DATE 08/03/92
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND PURSUANT TO THE ORAL
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS HELD JULY 31, 1992,
THE COURT HAVING TAKEN THE MATTER OF ITS DECISION UNDER
ADVISEMENT, RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (TREATED AS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT) IS GRANTED FOR THE REASONS STATED IN THE MEMORANDA
IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
2. COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE
ORDER.
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WILLIAM H. 5ABBEL
Pro Se
P.O. Pox 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT
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WILLIAM H. BABBEL,
Appellant,

:

vs.

:

TAMARA HOLDEN,

:

Appeallee.

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SUMMARY REVERSAL

Case No.

.

000O000

COKES NOV: the appellant, William H. Babbel, and pursuant to
the Rules of this Court and in Support of the Motion for Summary
Reversal of the District Court's Order, submits the following
Memorandum,
FACTS
On 5 June 1992, the appellant filed a petition for habeas
corpus relief in the Third Judicial District Court, J. Dennis
Frederick, Jud;;e, presiding. The petition was filed in Third District
Court as a result of an Order in the United States District Court,
requiring the appellant to return ta State Court and exaust issues
not previously exausted. The petition filed in Third District Court
raised eight issues.

1

. The evidence used at trial was gained through a warrant wnich

was obtained by the use of false information in the affidavit in
support of the search warrant, given by Detective Larry Cazier,
2. Detective Larry Cazier perjured himself during the supression
hearing to ascertain that the illegally seized evidence would be
admitted into evidence.
3. ^he appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel during
the supression hearing, at trial and on appeal.
k. That the appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel
on his second appeal in this Court.
5» That the Deputy County Attorney withheld Detective Cazierfs notes
because he knew that they would show the detective was never told
about a specific piece of evidence, which was admitted into evidence.
6. That the initial entry onto the appellants property by Det. Cazier
was illegal and gained through threats and lies.
7. That the seizure of a "55 M.P.H. Sucks Button" was in violation
of the appellants Fourth Amendment Rights.
8. That the trial Court abused it's discretion in refusing to consider
evidence in mitigation when it sentenced the appellant to three
terms of ten years to life, pursuant to this Court's order in
Pabbel I, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989).
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss in part stating that
the appellant had had the opportunity to address these issues in
a previous petition filed in Third District Court. After briefing

the issues and having oral arguments, Judge Frederick dismissed
the petition, (See order attached to Docketing Statement)
Subsequently, this appeal was taken,
WHY THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL
In the petition for habeas corpus relief filed in Third
District Court, the appellant articulated sufficient facts, supported
by documentation, which show that there was a fundamental unfairness
on the part of the State in obtaining the conviction in this matter;
and that counsels' repeated failure to raise issues or supply the
appellant with documents with which to raise the issues himself,
give rise to sufficient "unusual circumstances" to warrant a second
petition for habeas corpus relief. (See petition attached as Exhibit
A to this Motion)
While the petition raises several claims, they can be put into
four catagories;
1. ^hat Det. Cazier used false information to gain a search
warrant, thus making his search illegal;
2. That Cazier compounded this false information by cornmiting
perjury during the supression hearing, thus making sure that the
illegally seized evidence was admitted;
3. That the appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel
at various stages of this case, to include; Brooke Wells failure
to show that Cazier used false information in gaining the warrant,

that the Detective lied during tne supression hearing, that Ms,
Wells failed to compel production of supposed notes in the
possession of :)et. Cazier, and that Ms. .veils refused to raise
issues on appeal that the appellant wanted raised, further that
Joan Watt refused to raise issues on appeal that the appellant
specifically wanted raised, or supply the appellant with the necessary
documents to raise the issues himself.
4. And, that Judge Scott Daniels abused his discretion in
refusing to consider evidence in mitigation prior to imposing three
ten year to life terms of imprisonment.
While the issues of Detective Cazier obtaining a warrant illegally
and commiting perjury, and Ms. Wells ineffectiveness were known to
the appellant at the time of the filing of the first petition, the
appellant could not have brought those issues without the necessary
documents, and transcripts with which to prove the allegations.
Ms. Wells supplied the respondent with an affidavit, which was
attached to the motion to dismiss the petition. In that affidavit
Ms. Wells states that the appellant had access to the transcripts
to the proceedings, prior to trial, to include the supression hearing
transcripts. Ms. Wells fails to note that the supression hearing
transcripts were not transcribed until two months after the trial
had ended. See Ms. Wells affidavit attacned as Exhibit B to this
Motion, and the Certificate of Susan S. Sprouse, certifying that
the transcripts were not produced until 30 December 1985.
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Ms. Wells affidavit also clearly states that she did not raise
issues that the appellant wanted raised* Ms. ".veils includes letters
to her and Jeffrey Hunt, the intern that wrote the brief, which
show the specific allegations that the appellant wanted raised.
Ms. Wells affidavit clearly shows that she did not raise issues
that the appellant wanted raised. This admission falls squarely
within the language the Utah Court of Appeals used in Wagstaff v.
Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah App. 1990) "On direct appeal,
Wagstaffs appointed counsel failed to raise the representation
argument, contrary to Wagstaff1s expressed desire. This places the
case squarely within the language of Chess v. Smith and constitutes
and obvious injustice justifying habeas corpus relief.fl Accord
Jensen v. leland, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1989). See also Chess v.
Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah 1980).
This Court addressed the "unusual circumstances test" in Hurst v.
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989), stating in part; that, "a
conviction may nevertheless be challenged by collateral attack in
"unusual circumstances", that is where an obvious injustice or a
substantial denial of a constitutional right has occured, irrespective
of whether an appeal has been taken."
Both Ms. Wells and Ms. Watt refused to raise issues on appeal that
the appellant wanted raised. Ms. Wells states that she did not
raise those issues, and the respondent has never argued that Ms.
Watt refused to raise issues the appellant wanted raised. These
two allegations satisfy the unusual circumstances test that was
developed by this Court.

Further, the allegations of Detective Cazier using false information
in the affidavit, and commiting perjury during the supression hearing
were suoported by the record. This allegation was not made in the
hopes of being able to Drove it, it was made and substantiated with
the record. "Does the use of perjured testimony and illegally seized
evidence to gain a conviction rise to a level of a denial of a right
.guaranteed constitutional right ? The appellant believes that it
ioes indeed*
Attached to this yemorandum (as Exhibit D) is a copy of the affidavit
Cazier furnished to Judge burton in support of the warrant. In that
affidavit Cazier states that Karen Sine described the truck as having
a cracked windshield, drink holders on the dash, and orange seat
covers* Cazier also testified to this during the supression hearing.
See Exhibit E to this Memorandum. But during trial it came out, thru
cross examination that Not only did Karen Sine describe the truck
as having white seats, but that the truck Cazier saw in the appellants
driveway did not have drink holders in it. After removing these two
items from the warrant, because they did not exist at the time the
detective saw the truck, it leaves a brown Chevrolet truck with a
cracked windshield and a 55 Sucks button on the dash. The State did
not ever establish that the windshield was cracked. And the button
which has been the object of review, was never described to the
detective in any report. He claimedthat it only existed in his
hand written notes, ?.ut both he and the State refused to make those
notc-'available to the appellant or his counsel. The button was only

recalled by Karen Sine on the day of trial after prompting by the
ietective. See Exhibit F to this I emorandum.
Both testimony by the detective and photos taken oy tne Salt Lake
County Sheriffs* Office on the day of the search establish that
the seats were not white as described by the victim, Laren Sine,
that there were no drink holders on the dash, and that the windshield was not cracked. See Exhibit G to this Memorandum. In TT,
221-22-23-24, Cazier's own reports indicate that he believed that
the truck he was looking for had white seats, in fact, the detective
was looking for a light colored truck, as is evidenced by his own
testimony at trial. See Exhibit H to this Memorandum. Ms. Sine's
testimony establishes that there were no drink holders on the dash
of the truck on the day Cazier saw it. See Exhibit I to this
Memorandum. Additionally, Ms. Sine never identified the truck itself.
See Exhibit J to this Memorandum.
n

oth the record and Caziers1 reports show, very clearly, that the

detective used false information to gain the warrant, and then
perjured himself to make sure that the illegally seized evidence
was admitted.
The appellant believes that these facts give rise to a violation
of the due process clause of both the Utah Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States.
Ms. Wells had all the documents which established that Cazier used
false information to gain the warrant, and that he lied during the
supression hearing. Additionally she should have raised this as an

issue on appeal, but refused. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 692 (1983), the Court neld that, "except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeeing would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to
undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial." Counsel
failed to use information known to her to show that Cazier lied in
the affidavit and during the supression hearing. Had she done so,
the result of the trial would probably

have been different*

Likewise, had Ms. Wells shown, on appeal, that the detective used
false information, and perjury to gain evidence, the decision in
State v. ^abbel, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), might have been just as
different. In Babbel I this Court held; "Although we conclude that
the magistrate did not err in finding tne affidavit sufficient, we
must observe that this is a close question. If the affidavit were
more vague, we might well reach the opposite conclusion." See footnote 3. Justice Zimmerman, for the Court, stated; We acknowledge
that the affidavit is ambiguous in its use of the word "match", but
conclude that it was within the magistrates discretion to construe
Cazier1s statement that 3abbel(l)!s (sic) truck matched the description to mean that the truck matched with respect to those
characteristics expressly described in the affidavit. The record
clearly shows that the affidavit contained false information. With
that false information, there were insufficient facts to sustain
probable cause to issue the warrant. The only other paragraph that
made reference to the appellant was removed from the affidavit by

stipulation of the parties. See Babpel I, 992, footnote 2.
In ^ranks v. Oeleware, 438 U.J. 154 (1978), the Court held; "when
determining whether misstatements contained in an affidavit in
support of a search warrant should invalidate the warrant, the
court must determine whethter any misstatement

was material, that

is (1) whether it was critical to a finding of prooable cause, (2)
whether it was deliberately made, and, (3) wnether without the
information probable cause would not have been established.11
In the instant matter it is obvious that the description given by
Karen oine was crucial to a finding of probable cause. Without
that description there would have been no information on which to
issue the warrant. When Cazier was confronted with his reports and
numerous photos and witness statements, he admitted that the truck
did not match in at least three respects he had articulated in his
affidavit in support of the warrant. That left a brown Chevrolet
pickun. Which was not enough to establish probable cause. Were these
misstatements made deliberately. The appellant believes that they
were. Cazier made the same statements numerous times. But when, and
only wnen, he was confronted with his reports, photos, and the
witness statements he recorded, did he tell the truth. This Court
sustained the warrant because the detective used the descriptions
he used. But, if this Court had known that the information was
false, had Brooke Wells brought to this Court's attention that the
information was false, would it have ruled as it did. The appellant
does not believe so.

Ms. V/ells knew that the information in the affidavit was incorrect.
She was supplied with copies of the reports and statements in June
of 1985. A full two months before the supression nearing. She was
told numerous times by the appellant that the truck did not match
the description in the affidavit. Still she refused to raise the
issue before Judge 3aniels. After numerous phone calls and letters,
after the trial, she refused to raise the issue on appeal. Ms. V/ells
conduct falls with the meaning of unusual circumstances articulated
by this Court. Further, the conduct of Ms. Watt refusing to raise
issues of Ms. Wells ineffective assistance on appeal meet the same
test. When the appellant filed his appeal in 3abbe 1 II he requested
that counsel be appointed. He specifically requested that neither
Ms. Wells, nor anyone be appointed from the Legal Defenders Assoc,
because of ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Ms. Watt was appointed
anyway. Once appointed, she refused to raise issues the appellant
wanted raised. See Exhibit K, letter to Brooke Wells, and Exhibit
L, motion for appointment of counsel, to this Memorandum. After Ms.
Watt refused to raise these issues, but before she withdrew as
counsel, the appellant asked Ms. Watt for copies of the police
reports, witness statements ect. The appellant wanted to raise these
issue in the first petition. Ms. Watt indicated that she could not
produce them for several months. Which was four months after the
initial petition was already dismissed.
The appellant has tried to raise these issues on numerous occaisons,
but has been precluded by counsels refusal to raise them or to

sunnly the appellant with documents to raise tnem himself. The
appellant has never tried to delay the process or abuse the writ.
The appellant only now raised the issues because he had tne documents
to do so. during the initial filing of the first petition, the
appellant contacted Mr. Coeffrey Butler of this Court, to try to
get copies of the transcripts, but was told that the State had
them and that they were not available. The appellant believes that
Justice Jurham took notice of this fact during oral arguments in
Tabbel II. ^he appellant never had all of the transcripts or documents
with which to articulate or prove the allegations in this petition
until August of 1991. Two months after the initial petition had
been dismissed.
Do the facts articulated in the petition meet the unusual
circumstances test developed by this Court ? The appellant believes
that they do.
held;

,f

In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035, this Court

this Court has frequently addressed and resolved the merits

of claims asserted in petitions for writs of habeas corpus even
though the issues raised were' known or should have been Known at
the time of conviction or appeal. It follows, and is has long been
our law, that a procedural default is not always determinative of a
collqteral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial
was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony
with constitutional standards.'1 The Court also stated that any
number of petitions could be sought for good cause shown. In defining
good cause, the Court stated,

,?

A showing of good cause that

justifies the filing of a successive claim may be established by
showing, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction,
and (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or
abuse the writ."
The claims as to Ks. .Veils refusal to raise issues on appeal fall
within the language of "obvious injustice" articluated in Wagstaff,
Chess, and Jensen. These cases also apply to the claims of Ms. Watts
refusal. The claims of false information and perjury by _)et. Cazier
also fall with the language of obvious injustice, or unusual circumstances, or good cause as are articulated in Dunn v. Cook, and
Hurst v. Cook. Supra.
The United States Supreme Court visited the issue of perjured testimony
in Brady"v".~Mary 1 and, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), the Court stated; "if
a state has contrived a conviction
deception of the court
known to be perjured

. . .
.

.

.

.

. through a deliberate

by the presentation of testimony

. such a contrivance by the state to

procure a conviction of a defendant is as inconsistent with the
rudimentry demands of justice as is obtaining of a like result by
intimidation." Citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, and Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213. The went on to say; "These allegations
sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the
federal constitution and, if proven would entitle petitioner to
release from his present custody."
Cazier1s perjury constitutes a substantial and prejudicial denial

12.

of a constitutional right justifying riaoeas corpus relief.
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 L.ed.2d 143, the Court
stated;

,f

the princinle of res judicata is inapplicable in habeas

cornus proceedings, Conventional notions of finality have no place
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged. This Court, in Hurst stated that neither
"collateral estoppel nor issue preclusion is an absolute defense
in habeas corpus proceeding." And in )unn v. Cook,

791 P.2d 873

(Utah 1990), this Court again stated; "The doctrines of waiver and
res judicata do not stand as an unyeilding bar to the litigation
of claims that either once were or could have been litigated in
a prior proceeding. The policy of finality certainly does have a
high nlace in our hierarchy of judicial values, but that policy
is not so compelling as to be more important than the vindication
of a persons constitutional right to a fair trial." Justice Stewart
went on to say, "Howsoever desirable it may be to adhere to the rules,
the law should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice
has resulted the defendant should be without a remedy."
The appellant in this matter has shown that there is sufficient
good cause to warrant habeas corpus review of his claims. His counsel
has refused to raise issues on appeal, and during proceedings prior
trial, the investigating detective used false information to gain
a search warrant, and perjured himself to insure that evidence he
seized was admitted, and the trial court imposed sentence while

refusing to consider evidence in mitigation.
Judge Frederick erred in dismissing all the claims. Good cause
was shown. Good cause within the meaning of this Courtfs prior
decisions. The claims as to Joan Watt and Judge Janiels should
not have been dismissed because those claims came after the initial
petition had been dismissed. Joan Watt was still counsel of record
before this Court, and the issue of Judge Janiels was still before
this Court on a petition for re-hearing. Which was not denied until
two months after the initial petition was dismissed.
The claims in this petition warranted an evidentiary hearing,
and, if proven warranted habeas corpus relief. The appellant has
shown good cause, and that unusual circumstances exist. Judge Frederick
erred in granting summary judgement, and ruling that the petition
was frivilous.
Justice Louis 0. Brandeis once stated that, "Crime is contagious,
if the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the
law. To declare that in the administration of criminal law, the end
justifies the means, to declare that the government may commit crimes
in order to secure a conviction of a private criminal, would be
to bring terrible retribution.'1 Justice cannot be served if a
detective is allowed to lie to obtain a warrant, and then lie to
make sure his illegally seized evidence is admitted. That type of
conduct is as illegal as the crimes the appellant was convicted of.
In Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court held that,
,tT,

he interest of the United otates in a criminal prosecution, is

not that it shall win the case, but that justice will be done."

Is T'tahfs interest any different ? Does the Ltate want to win at
any cost, so long as it wins

9

In Donnelly v. )eChristofana, 416

U.S. 637 (1974), the Court stated, "The function of the prosecutor
under the federal constitution is not to tack as many skins of
victims to the wall. His function is to vindicate the rights of
the people expressed in the laws and give those accused of a
crime a fair trial.11
Is a trial fair wnen a detective lies to get illegally seized
evidence admitted ?

Is the process fair when the defendants right

under the Sixth Amendment, to effective assistance of counsel is
denied ? Is the sentencing process fair when a judge refuses to
consider mitigating evidence ? The appellant does not believe that
fundamental fairness exists when these facts are present. The facts
articulated in the petition, supported by Ms. Wells affidavit and
the record itself warranted an evidentiary hearing. Those facts
sufficiently show that both good cause and unusual circumstances
exist. Judge Frederick1 holding that the petition is frivilous is
without basis, and flies in the face of the decisions cited above.
Especially those decisions cited from this Court. The appellant has
shown that the petition warrants an evidentiary nearing, and if the
facts are proven, he should be granted habeas corpus relief.
WHEREFORE the appellant prays that this Court will reverse
the order of the district Court, and remand this matter back for
an evidentiary hearing.
lA^D this

day of September 1992

WILLIAM K. BABBEL
Pro Se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH
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WILLIAM H. 3ABBEL,
PETITION FOR POST
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M. TAMARA HOLDEN,
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Case
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COMES NOW the petitioner, William E. Babbel, and piirsu'ant>,ta,v''v^
Rule 65B (b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for cause of action
states and alleges;
'1. That he is the petitioner in the above-entitled action.
2. That M. Tamara Holden is the Warden of the Utah State Prison
and currently has custody of the petitioner.
3# That this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as
is enumerated in Title 78-3-4 (1), and (2), of the Utah Code Ann,
4. That the statute of limitations enumerated in Title 78-1231.1, of the Utah Code Ann, are not applicable in the instant case,
as the petitioner was tried and convicted prior to the enactment
of the above statute. Any application,; of the statute of limitations

in this matter would be an ex post facto application of the law.
(See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990).)
5. The petitioners conviction was entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
in CR-85-843. The Honorable Scott Daniels presiding.
6. The petitioner was found guilty of three counts, and
not guilty of one count. Guilty on two counts of aggravated
sexual assault, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. Not
guilty of aggravated robbery.
7. The petitioner was found guilty after trial by jury.
8. The petitioner pleaded not guilty.
9. The petitioner was found guilty after a two day trial on
28 October 1985.
10. The petitioner did not testify at trial.
11. The petitioner appealed the conviction to the Utah
Supreme Court.

h

12. The Court upheld the conviction and issued their decision i v /
on 3 March 1989.
13. The grounds raised on appeal were; that the evidence

- V^
0\

seized and used at trial was seized illegally, and that without
the ilegally seized evidence, the evidence at trial would have
been insufficient to sustain the verdict. The decision of the
Court is cited as State v. Babbel, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), and
is attached as Exhibit A.

«

.iY/

14# Cn appeal, the Court vacated the petitioners sentences
and ordered him resentenced, because, the trial court had failed
to impose sentences that complied with the required minimum/
mandatory time frame,
15. The petitioner appealed the new harsher sentences as
violating the double jeopardy clause. The Court found no merit
in that argument and upheld the sentences in State v. Babbel,
813 P.2d

, (Utah 1991). The petitioner filed a timely petition

for re-hearing alleging that the trial court had refused to consider
evidence in mitigation* The Court denied rehearing.
l6#The petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court. Cert, was denied. 3abbe1 v.
Utah,

' 'U.S.

(1992)

17. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in this Court in December 1990. (910900585HC)• This petition was
denied by Judge David Young on or about 20 June 1991. The petition
alleged ineffectiveness of counsel during plea discussions.
That matter is on appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals.
18. The issues presented in this petition were not presented
previously because the petitioners trial counsel had the transcripts,
and the petitioner could not gain access to them. Only after the
petition was filed did the petitioner receive the transcripts.
This issue could not have been discovered without the transcripts
of the trial and the supression hearings.

3.

19. The above petition was brought because the petitioners
counsel on appeal would not bring ineffective assistance of
counsel allegations against his trial counsel Brooke C. Wells.
20. The petitioners counsel on appeal at that time was Joan
Watt of the Legal Defenders Association. A colleague of Ms. Wells.
After the petition was filed, Ms. Watt withdrew as counsel on
appeal. Mr. Walter Bugden than appeared as counsel.
21. The petitioner was represented by Brooke C. Wells in all
of the motion hearings and at trial in this matter, as well the
first appeal.
22. The petitioner was represented by Joan C. Watt on the
second appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
23. The petitioner was represented by Robert D. Pusey at
the evidentiary hearing on the previous petition.
24* The petitioner brought the appeal on the petition as
well as the petition for writ of certiorari pro~se.
25 • The petitioners restraint is illegal and unlawful in
that

the evidence used at- trial was illegally seized pursuant to

a warrant which was gained by perjured testimony.of Larry Cazier.
26. The evidence illegally seized was admitted at trial by
use of perjured testimony of Detective Larry Cazier.
27. The petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel
during the supression hearing on the illegally seized evidence,
and on appeal.

28. The petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel
on appeal when Ms* watt refused to raise ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.
29. FACTS:
On 22 April 1985, Det. Larry Cazier went to the petitioners home
in West Jordan. After discussion with the petitioners family, the
detective made threats to the effect that the petitioner would be
shot and questions asked later. After the threats were made, the
detective was allowed to look into the petitioners _vtruck. After
looking into the bed and cab of the truck, the detective went to,
then, Deputy County Attorney Barbara Bearnson, who prepared an
affidavit and search warrant. In the affidavit in support of the
warrant, the detective relied on three paragraphs to find sufficient
probable cause to issue the warrant. See attached copy of affidavit
and warrant in Exhibit B. The first two paragraphs recounted the
descriptions of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction. The
third paragraph was information told to the detective by another
detective.
It should be noted, that on appeal, the State stipulated that
the third paragraph, containing information of Detective Virgil
Johnson, should not be considered when reviewing the sufficiency
of the affidavit. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. See Babbel I
770 P.2d 992 foot note 2.
Once that paragraph is removed, the only statements left to
find probable cause are the two paragraphs describing the truck.

The f i r s t paragraph relates the victims description of the
vehicle,
"Karen Sine described the interior of the
vehicle as having orange seat covers, a
cracked windshield, beverage holders on
the dashboard, a 55 *np& sucks button on
the driverside-visor, and a cassette
player in the dashboard,"
The detective stated that the truck "matched11 that description.
During the suppression hearing the detective testified that the
victim described the truck as having orange seat covers, in response
to a question by Ms. Wells. Supression Hearing transcripts at
page 51.
On page 44 of the same transcripts the detective testified in
response to the following question;
Q.

"All right. And you swore to Judge Burton at the time the

information contained in that probable cause statement was true
and correct to t he best of your knowledge; isn't that right;?
A. "Yes I did."
The following exchange took place at pg. 51 of the suppression
hearing transcripts.

Q.

"Your reports indicate that Karen Sine had described the

interior of the truck as having orange seat covers or portions of
cushions; isn't that right ?
A.

"Correct."

6.

At trial during questioning by Mr. Vuyk, the following exchange
took place;
Q.

"Tell me what she said about the interior.

A.

"She recalled that the front seat was what she referred to

as orange spongy material. She described two drink holders that
were mounted on the dash."

T.T. at 207

But when the detective was confronted with his own reports,
he changed that testimony.
Q. (By Ms. Wells) And in that report you describe the description
given to you as not having orange seats right ?
A.

Well - -

Q#

You donft describe it as having orange seats do you ?

A.

Well, lets compare reports.

Q#

If you111 look at page four of your report.

A.

I'm on page 4.

Q#

On the third paragraph approximately the seventh line down,

you've described there what her description of the interior looks
like, donft you ?
A. Yes.
Q.

And there you don't say anything about orange seat covers

do you ?
A.
Q.

No. She said white—
•

.

• you do say something about white seat covers ?

A. Thats correct.

Q.

And you d o n ' t say anything about yellow s e a t covers a t a l l , do

you ?
A. It says white.
See trial transcripts at 222, 223.
The detective also stated that the truck had drink holders
of the wire type mounted on the dash. But during cross examination
by Ms. Wells the detective testified that he did not have the
drink holders. The detective had pictures taken of the truck, just
as he saw it on the day the search was conducted* See T.T. at 211.
Deputy Bruce Clemins took the pictures:£hat were- -to ^become-States
Exhibits S-1, S-3, and S-4.
During cross examination Karen Sine made the following
responses to questions by Ms* Wells.
Q#

T.T. at 183.

Now let me show you whats been marked as States Exhibit S-3.

Q. Now, in that picture you don't see any cassette tapes, do you ?
A. No.
Q. You don't see any drink holders, do you ?
A. No.
Q. You don't see any type cord hanging down, do you ?
A. No.
Q. You don't see any beer bottles, do you ?
The detectives own testimony and the pictures he had taken
establish that the truck did not match the description given by
the victim. His own testimony that his reports indicated that the

victim described the truck as having orange spongy seats, is later
contradicted when confronted with the reports. The report states
"white spongy material like s tyro foam11. See attached report in
Exhibit C. The detective made £alse statements in the affidavit
in support of the warrant. Further he compounded this perjury by
re-stating it in court, and only corrected himself when confronted
with his reports. The truck did not match the description given
by the victim. It did not have drink holders on the dash, the
seats were yellow and black, not orange and not white as he had
memorialized in his reports. No evidence was ever introduced to
establish that the truck had a broken windshield, and the 55 niph
sucks button was never mention in any report. Additionally, the
victim, Karen Sine did not mention the button in a 26 page recorded
statement, at the preliminary hearing, or in the written report
made by the detective. She only "rembered the button'1 when the
detective showed it to her on the day of trial and showed her a
photograph of where it was in the truck.

The detective stated that

the button was mentioned.in his field notes but refused to turn the
notes over to either the defense or the State. See S.H. at 47, and
T.T. at 231.
The transcripts referred to in this petition are included
in this petition as Exhibit D.
The truck did not match the description given by the victim
to the detective. In swearing that the truck matched the victims

description, the detective perjured himself. This perjury was
compounded by Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Tom Vuyk during
trial, Mr. Vuyk having read the reports and knowing that the
report stated "white spongy" seats asked the detective what color
she stated and then did nothing when the detective comitted perjury
again. T.T. at 207.
Without that one paragraph, the Utah Supreme Court would have
most probably struck down the warrant. See Babbel I,

992, and 992

footnote 3. The Court held that the affidavit was very poor and it
was a "very close question".
30. FACTS:
Petitioners counsel, Brooke C. Wells, was given the police reports
and witness statements three months prior to the :supression
hearing before Judge Daniels. Counsel had several weeks to read
and look over the reports. Additionally, the petitioner told her
during several meetings that the truck did not have white seats,
as the reports indicated. Counsel knew that the reports stated
white seats. However, counsel did not raise the discrepencies in
the reports until the time of trial. After the illegally seized
evidence had been admitted. Had counsel used the reports at the
supression hearing, and shown that the truck did not match the
descriptions, the evidence probably would not have been admitted.
Further, if counsel would have shown that the detective used such
false information in the affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court would

10.

probably have ruled differently than they did. Counsel's failure
to use the reports at the supression hearing fell below the
standard of performance expected „f trial counsel. Additionally,
because the Court found the affidavit so lacking, there is a very
likely probability that the warrant would have been struck down
on appeal, if not at trial. Because one of the two paragraphs
used to establish probable cause contained false information,
the affidavit and warrant would have failed.
Counsel did use the reports at trial, but the evidence was already
before the jury. Even after showing that the detective used false
information, counsel did not raise it before the Utah Supreme Court.
Had counsel shown that the truck did not match, as the detective
stated in the affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court would have ruled
differently than they did.
31. FACTS:
After the petitioner was resentenced, he appealed the new sentences
pro se. After failing to get case law from the contract firm at
the prison, the petitioner moved for appointment of counsel.
Specifically stating that he did not want anyone fron the Legal
Defenders Association appointed because of ineffectiveness of
counsel. The court appointed Joan ,vratt anyway.

See Exhibit E to

this petition. The petitioner requested Ms.tfattto review the
brief filed and asked if ineffective assistance of counsel

could

be raised. Ks.tfattindicated that she could not raise any issue
against Ms. Wells.
11.

52. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
consider the mitigating circumstances presented by the petitioner
and authorized by U.C.A. 76-3-201(5)(c).
FACTS*

In Babbel I, the Utah Supreme Court vacated the

petitioner's original sentences because they did not conform to the
statutory punishments for the offenses for which he was convicted.
The sentences first imposed were illegal because the trial court
treated the convictions as if they were ordinary first degree
felonies, rather than first degree felonies subject to minimum/
mandatory sentences. Based upon the mandate of U.C.A. 77-35-22(e),
(supp# 1981), the Supreme Court directed the petitioner be resentenced.
At the time of the re-sentencing on March 24, 1989* the
petitioner had been incarcerated nearly fourt years. During the
period of his incarceration at the Utah State Prison, the petitioner
availed himself of many treatment and rehabilitation programs
offered by the Department of Corrections. These counseling programs
included the Intermountain-Sexual Abuse Treatment (I.S.A.T.) and a
Southwest Utah Mental Health program. Additionally, the petitioner
received no disciplinary write-ups while housed at the Utah State
Prison.
In eschewing this mitigation evidence, the trial judge did not
rule that the evidence failed to justify imposing the lowest term
of severity. Instead, the trial court made the threshold decision
to not even consider the proffered evidence. The judge erroneously
believed that he was constrained to consider aggravation and

mitigation in the context of only the crime* The trial court
elaborated on this reasoning by stating, "I'm really talking about
the facts of the crime itself." (3/24/89 Transcript, pg. 13)
Yet nothing in the governing statute requires such a limitation
on the evidence. In fact the statute states ;
In determining whether there are circumstances
that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record
in the case, the probation officers report,
other reports, including reports received
under section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation
or mitigation submitted by the prosecution
or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
U.C.A. 76-3-201-(5)(c)
In refusing to consider evidence presented by the petitioner,
the trial court abused itfs discretion.
33. Petitioners current sentences are illegal in that the
trial court went beyond the meaning of Rule 22 (e) f U.R.Cr.P.
FACTS: In Babbel I. the Supreme Court ordered the petitioner
resentenced because the sentences imposed by the trial court failed
to comply with the minimum/mandatory time scheme. When the trial
court corrected the sentences, it should have only corrected the
portion of the sentence that was illegal. That being, that the
court failed to impose the minimum/mandatory term, and did not
state itfs reasons for the sentence given on the record. The original
terms iiaposed by the trial court were legal sentences and should
not have been increased. See Babbel II, page two, footnote 1.
(Babbel II is attached to the petition as Exhibit A)
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34# Deputy County Attorney Tom Vuyk knowingly used and relied
on false testimony to secure use of illegally seized evidence.
FACTS: Prior to trial Dpty Co. Atty Vuyk had possession of
all the official police reports in this matter. He knew that the
reports stated that the victim identified the color of the truck
seats as white. Not orange. Additionally, Tom Vuyk knew that the
photos taken of the truck clearly showed that the truck did not
have white seats, or beverage holders on the dash. Despite these
established facts, Vuyk allowed the testimony of Det. Cazier, to
the effect that the truck matched as to those descriptions to remain
in the record at the supression hearing. Vuyk relied and used this
testimony in his argument to the court, not to supress the evidence
illegally seized. The photos mention above are the States exhibits
used at the supression hearing, and at trial. As previously stated,
these photos clearly show that the truck did not match. This is
cooborated by the victims testimony, attached as an exhibit to this
petition. Tom Vuyk knew that the reports did not state "orange seats".
Tom Vuyk knew that the truck did not have beverage holders in it,
as the affidavit in support of the warrant stated. But he did
nothing to correct this mis-information presented to the court at
the supression hearing. Had it been shown that the affidavit had
false information in it, it is possible that the outcome would have
been different. Tom Vuyk intentionally let false testimony into
the record at the supression hearing and relied on it to gain the
admission of illegally seized evidence.

U.

35. Deputy County Attorney Tom Vuyk with-held documents after
he was served with a motion to discover evidence he intended to use
at trial.
FACTS: During the preliminary hearing, counsel for the petitioner
filed a motion to-discover evidence* To include all police reports,
statements, ect. The State turned over most, but not all of the
documents sought by counsel.
In the affidavit in support of the warrant, Cazier made a
reference to a stick pin button, which had "55 M.P.H. Sucks", printed
on it. Stating that the victim described the button. But in a very
detailed statement, 26 pages, the victim never mentions the button.
Nor is it mentioned in any report that Cazier prepared. When asked
about the truck at preliminary, the victim never mentions the button.
The victim did, however, recall the button on the day of trial, but
only after Cazier had shown it to her, and told her where it was in
the truck.
During trial, and the supression hearing, the detective testified
from his personal notes. Which, according to Cazier, was the only
place that the buttoned was mentioned. While on the stand the detective used the notes to refresh his memory, and then give testimony.
But, after using those notes to secure illegally seized evidence,
and to give testimony, the State never turned those notes over to
the petitioner or his counsel. Those notes were crucial to the case
presented by the State. But the defense was not given copies for
impeachment purposes.

Because those notes were the only place, allegedly, that any type
reference was made to the button, those notes should have been made
available to the defense. Especially when the detective used them
on the witness stand.
The petitioner was denied crucial material after a motion for
discovery was filed. The State's attorney intentionally with-held
those notes from the defense, because, the petitioner believes, they
would show that the descriptions given by the victim were in fact
different from those Cazier used in the affidavit,
36. Counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an order from
the court requiring that those notes be turned over.
37. The intrusion onto the property known as 8558 South 3830
West, West Jordan, Utah was illegal, and the subsequent visual
search of the petitioners truck violated the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Consitution,
PACTS: On 22 April, 1985, Det. Cazier went to the petitioners
home and requested to see the petitioner* Identifying himself only
ff

as a friend of Bills". After being told that the petitioner was

not at home, the detective went across the street and held sack on
the home. After surveilling the home for several hours, the detective
returned. He told the petitioners mother that the petitioner was
wanted, and that he wanted to search the petitioners truck, Cazier
was told that he could not search the truck. He stated to petitioner's
mother, that the petitioner was armed and dangerous and would be
shot on sight. He was then allowed to look into the truck.

After looking into the truck and making notes of the contents,
Cazier sought a warrant. But even after looking into the truck,
he did not put factual information into the affidavit. The initial
intrusion into the property and the subsequent looking into the
truck are violative of the Fourth Amendment for two reasons.
First, Cazier used threats and coercion to gain access to the truck
to gain information he could not have otherwise have gotten. The
truck could not be seen from the street, (the interior, or the bed),
nor could it be seen from the walk to the house from the street.
And as if by coincedence, the stick pin button first appeared in
written form right after the illegal intrusion.
Second, the petitioner was the registered owner of the truck. No
other person used or had access to the use of the truck. The
petitioners mother was not an owner or user of the vehicle, and
could not give permission for the police to look into the truck.
After making the threats to petitioners mother, Cazier did not tell
her that she did not have to let him look into the truck. He left
her with the impression that the petitioner would be shot on sight
if he was not allowed to look into the vehicle.
After looking at the truck, Cazier sought a warrant. Knowing that
the truck did not match the descriptions given by the victim, Cazier
intentionally supplied false information to the court to gain the
warrant. The seats did not match, no drink holders, and no crack
in the windshield. And tye button only became noticed after the
illegal intrusion.
17.

38. The seizure of the stick pin button violated the Fourth
Amendment.
FACTS: The stick pin button was not an item to be seized in
the body of the warrant. It only appears in the affidavit in support
of the warrant. Cazier swore, under oath, that the victim had
described the button. But in a detailed 26 page statement, where
the victim recalled items as small as a piece of tape on the dash,
she never described the button. She described gauges, tapes, papers
mirrors, and cords, but never mentions the button. Nor does the
button appear in any other report. The victim did not recall it
in her statement,at preliminary hearing, and only recalled it at
trial, when Cazier showed it to her before she testified.
The button only appeared after Cazier used threats to gain access
to petitioners truck. During the supression hearing Cazier made
admissions to the effect he had mentioned he might have to use force
in arresting the petitioner. (See supression hearing transcripts in
Exhibit F)
39. The petitioner filed a petition in the U.S. District Court,
for the District of Utah on or about 15 May 1992. The Magistrate
filed his Report and Recommendation on 21 May 1992. In part
Magistrate Boyce stated that these issues have not been previously
presented to any Utah Court, and therefore, the petitioner must
go back, and let a Utah Court have -the opportunity to rule on the
issues presented. The federal petition alleged the same facts as
are alleged in this petition. The federal order states; The petitioner
still has state habeas corpus relief available to him on his claims.

547 (Utah 1989); Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). This
Court cannot say that remedy is still not available, especially
where petitioner asserts in his petition that counsel who represented
him at various stages refused to raise the issue of incompetency
of counsel. See discussion State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah
199D-"
Because of the Federal Court's ruling, in this matter, the petitioner
brings this petition to exaust his available state remedies.
40. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the federal
petition without prejudice on 27 May 1992. There are no other
existing petitions presently before any court, in this matter.
41. The facts as stated above violated the petitioners right
to a fair trial, appeal, and to the effective assistance of counsel.
42. The facts as stated above violated the petitioners rights
as are guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and his Article I,
sections 7, 11, 12, and 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, because the petitioners conviction was gained by the
use of false testimony, and he was denied effective assistance of
counsel at all stages of the preceedings, the petitioner prays that
this Court will hold a hearing, at which time the petitioner may
be represented by counsel, and decide this matter on the facts,
and the merits. And, if proven to be a true and correct recital of
the facts, issue a writ freeing the petitioner from his illegal
custody.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May 1992.

'William H. Babbel

Pursuant to the penalty for perjury enumerated in 28 U.S.C.
section 1746, I declare that the foregoing facts alleged in this
petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

.lliam H. Babbel

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-10 21
Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM H. BABBELL,
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:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
BROOKE C. WELLS

v.

:

HOLDEN, TAMARAM., Warden,
Utah State Prison,

:

Case No.

:

Judge J- DENNIS FREDERICK

920903226 HC

Respondent.
COMES NOW Brooke C. Wells, affiant, and hereby deposes,
states and swears under oath that:
1.

She is an attorney licensed to practice under the

laws of the State of Utah.
2.

She represented petitioner William H. Babbell

before the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
wherein Mr. Babbell was convicted of two counts of aggravated
sexual assualt ..and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in all
pretrial proceedings in that Court, and in Mr. Babbell's appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court, wherein his convictions were affirmed
in State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989).
3.

In the course of this affiant's preparing for

trial, Mr. Babbell was an active participant in assisting in the

preparation of his own defense, including the preparation of
research memoranda in support of the motion to suppress, directed
at excluding evidence obtained in a search of his vehicle.
Attached are two letters received by this affiant from Mr,
Babbell evidending such assistance.

In the letter dated November

11, 1985, Mr. Babbell notes discrepancies in the testimony of Ms,
Sine and Officer Cazier concerning the color of the truck.

In

the letter of September 14, Mr. Babbell again notes the
discrepancy in witness testimony concerning the color of the
truck and, further, congratulates me on my performance in dealing
with Officer Cazier.
4.

Petitioner was also an active participant in the

preparation of his appeal, evidenced by the attached letter of
February 6, 1986, to Jeffrey Hunt, a clerk who assisted this
affiant in the preparation of Mr. Babbell's appeal.

In this

letter Mr. Babbell specifically notes issues for appeal,
including Officer Cazeer's [sic] alleged perjured testimony
during the evidentiary hearing, the refusal of the County
Attorney's Office to supply allegedly favorable evidence to the
defense (Officer Cazier's notes) and allegedly misleading
comments by Mr. Vuyk in closing argument.
5. Affiant supplied Mr. Babbell with all transcripts
requested by Mr. Babbell at all stages of preparation prior to
trial and appeal, including transcripts of the motion to suppress
and trial. Mr. Babbell again requested copies of the preliminary
hearing and police reports only in the last six weeks, although

it is my firm belief that he had access to these documents
throughout the proceedings, considering his active assistance in
preparing his defense.
6.

Based on the discovery provided to me by the Salt

Lake County Attorney's Office, I never believed that there
existed firm grounds for claiming that Officer Cazier had
perjured himself, but rather that he had made mistakes subjecting
him to attacks on his credibility.
7.

In January, 1990, Salt Lake Legal Defender sent to

Mr. Babbell transcripts of the motion to suppress and the trial,
which to date he had not returned.
DATED this

^

day of July, 1992.

^ytilf
BROOKE C. WELLS
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this the
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pH->

day of July, 1992, before me,

, the undersigned officer, personally appeared

BROOKE C. WELLS, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within affidavit and acknowledged that she
executed the same for the purpose therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal.

.
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Mr. Jeffrery'Hunt
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116
Febuary 6 1986

Dear Mr, Hunt,
Thank you for your letter letting me know that you
are doing my appeal. In regard to whether or not I have anything
that I want to include, yes there are some areas that I have questions about. These areas are as follows;
1. Knowing use of perjured testimony by Detective Cazeer during the
evidentiary hearing, and in his affidavit in support of the warrant.
2. Illegally seized evidence.
3. Failure of the prosecution to inform the defence of evidence
that was favorable to our case.
4. Inconsistent testimony by the victim during all phases of the
proceedings.
5. Violation of the exclusionary rule by Cazeer during the trial.
And of course the misleading comments made by Vuyk during his
closing remarks.
First I will address the perjury by Cazeer. In his affidavit
he stated that the description he was going by when he searched
my truck was given to him by Ms. Sine. He also states this in the
transcripts of the evidentiary hearing. However, during the trial
while making reference to notes, that he refused to let Brooke look
at, he stated "she said that the truck was Tan. with a White interior,
until I showed her pictures of the defendants truck". Now this
being the case, and a matter of record, it is obvious that Cazeer
either lied during the trial, or more likely he lied in his affidavit
and the evidentiary hearing. This matter is in itself a reversable
error.
Next I find that the evidence was admitted by means of
deceit and of course knowing perjury by Cazeer. Along with all the
other abuse of authority Cazeer used in gaining the warrant I think
that the fact he lied abotie the description of the truck involved
in itself is an error.

If in fact Ms. Sine did not describe my truck and did in
fact describe a tan truck with a white interior then it is more than
obvious that he lied. Next the issue of the photo identification he
testified to during the trial. Cazeer stated in court that he had
shown photos to Sine the day after the search, however Sine stated
in court and during the preliminary that she was shown photos on
the day of her recorded statemnet and then again two weeks after
the search, not on the 23rd of April. If you look at Cazeer's testimony
you will see that he stated that he only showed Sine one set of photos.
But if you read the preliminary hearing and the trial, you will find
that Sine said she was shown books on the 19th and pictures two weeks
after.
If the field notes that Cazeer were shown to Vuyk, then he
knew that Sine said the truck that was used in the abduction was tan
with a white interior, if that is the case, he knew that Cazeer had
lied during the evidentiary hearing and on the affidavit. If he did
in fact know this and with held that information he was in violation
of the Utah Code. I further believe that he knew Cazeer had shown
Sine the evidence on the day of the trial. That in itself is a
violation of the exclusionary rule that was invoked by Judge Daniels
at the beginning of the trial...
I need to add to the point of Cazeer lying about the description of
the truck. HE COULD NOT HAVE SHOWN SINE ANY PICTURES OF THE TRUCK
BEFORE HE CONDUCTED THE SEARCH. The showing of pictures of the truck
had to have happened after the search, he then was proceeding under
the description of a tan truck with a white interior. The fact the
interior mentioned was white is documented in Cazeer's report dated
April 19 1985. It is also mentioned that he did not contact Sine on
the day of the search. He was then proceeding under his own conclusion that the truck was in fact the truck he wanted. This is
a violation of the rules of evidence, in as much as a showing of
probable cause needs to be made other than the officers "belief"
that the evidence is there.
The next point that I have found and backed up with Case Law is
in the area of Cazeer not allowing Brooke to look at his field notes.
Cazeer used those notes to refresh his memory while on the stand
and by law we had the right to look at those writings before he did
use them. I believe that Brooke included them in the suimons she
issued for the evidentiary hearing. However they were never produced.
The case law in this matter is at the end of this letter.
The inconsistent testimony that Sine gave during the trial
was so obvious that it should have been suppressed by the Judge.
Some of the areas that were inconsistent were abotu a mustache,
the color of the seat in the truck, the knife the gun, and description
of the truck. In Cazeers report of the 19th it states that the victim
said "he had no mustache and the color of the seat was white", there is
something about sunglasses and bald spots on the assailants head also.
During the preliminary Sine stated that she could not remember any
color in the truck, this is in the transcripts, and that the man had
a mustache. She also stated that I had dyed my hair, but during the
trial she said that it was the same as on the night of the crime.
During the trial she stated that she had made all those inconsistent
statements.

The fact that Cazeer violated the exclusionary rule is
in the transcripts of the trial. Sine admitted that Cazeer had shown
her the evidence on the day of the trial. This came when she made
a comment about the '55 M.P.H. SUCKS'1 button that she had failed to
identify any where prior to the trial. That button is not mentioned
in any of her statments nor during the preliminary hearing. In fact
at the pre-lim she was asked to recall any specif identifying mark
in the interior of the truck, she was unable to do this. It seems
obvious that she did not know of it's existence until Cazeer had
shown it ot her on the day of the trial. I will include the case law
that I have found in some of these areas, most of it has been sent
to Brooke already, but I will send it to you again. Thank You for
your time and assistance in this matter. I appreciate your help.

Sincerly,

><f£
William Babbel

1 I

C E R T I F I C A T E

2

3 I STATE OF UTAH
4

COUNTY OF SALT

)
LAKE

)

5

6|

I, Susan S. Sprouse, hereby certify that I am

7

a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State cf Utah; that

8

as such Certified Shorthand Reporter, I attended the hear-

9 J ing of the above-mentioned matter at that time and place
10 I set out herein; that thereat I took down in shorthand the
11

testimony given and the proceedings had therein; and that

12

thereafter I transcribed my said shorthand notes into type-

13

writing, *and that the foregoing transcription is a full,

14

true, and correct transcription of the same.
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) : ss
)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

Micheal

Burton

JUDGE
The undersigned

ADDRESS
affiant being

first duly

sworn, deposes and says:

That he \r-s reason to believe
That
fX) in the vehicle(s) described as 19"7! Chevrolet pickup
truck, License £MK31Z7, dark brown in color
[\)
on the premises known as 5 5 3 S South 3830 West with a
white camper located in the driveway; and the house at
the same address, a white and brown mobile home which
is not presently mobile
In the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State
there is now certain propertv or evidence described as:

of

Utah,

1. Small revolver, snub-nose type
2. Hunting knife, with approximately 6 M blade
3. Wondra Lotion
4. Large black flashlight
5.
Wallet, maroon in color, velcro fastner, containing credit cards
and identification of Karen Sine
6.
Clothing consisting of white short-sleeved O.P. Brand T-shirt,
blue baseball cap
and that said property

or evidence:

(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
Affiant
believes
the propertv
and
evidence
described
evidence of the crime(s) of Aggravated Sexual Assault,
Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery.

above
is
Aggravated

-Tr 1 T-v\ I * FOR SEARCH r. A\r.-.'
The facts
are:

to establish

the

grounds

for

issuance

of

a Search

Warrant

lour affiant, Detective Larry Ca:ier, Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office, has been employed by the Sheriff's Office for thirteen years
and has been assigned to the Sex Crimes Unit for two years, and
bases this request for a search warrant upon the following:
1)
A statement by Karen Sine that on April 18, 1985, at about 5:00
a.m. she was in Millcreek Canvor. with 3 other individuals when she
was approached bv a person who identified himself as a narcotics
officer and asked her to come with him.
Once inside his vehicle,
she was
taken
to a different
location
where
she was
sexually
assaulted and was deprived of her wallet by the suspect.
Karen Sine described the interior of the vehicle as having orange
seat
covers,
a
jc racked
windshielf,
beverage holders
on
the
M
dashboard, _a__J153_mpJti_s_ucks. button on the_d_ri_ve_i^_s side visor, and a
cassette play'er in the dashboard.
Th?_-1 Pther
individuals who saw __th e vietj.m__ l_e_aye with the suspect,
Lisa Jenkins, Jack Moyer, and Alfonso Ulibarri, describe _the truck
as a" older model Chevrolet 4-wheel _djiv_e pick-up, dark brown in
col_or, with no front or rear bumpers.
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and the description of the
suspect, Det. Virgil Johnson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office,
believed the vehicle may belong to William Babbel.
The detectives
drove by the address of the suspect, 8558 South 5830 Kest, and
noticed a truck in the dri veway that matched__t_he__jlescription.
The
suspect's mother, a FesTdent a! the address, gave the ""detectives
permission to look at the truck.
—
The suspect's mother stated that the suspect
camper located in the driveway and inside the
desc ri bed.

resides both in the
residence previously

The victim, Karen Sine, reports that luring sex acts forced upon her
by the suspect, he used Wondra lotion, which he obtained from the
glove box.
She also described
a___6_M___ hunting knife, and a small
revolver, the both of which ~ suspect placed behind the seat of the
pickup truck.
She further described his clothing as being a white
sh(^rt_^sle_e,ved_ J3.,?_. _brand T-Shirt "and" as him having wore a blue
baseball cap.
She also"""s t a t ed tne "susreci deprived her of her
r. a roorT" wallet" " Vi th a velcro fastener, containing her identification
and
credit
cards.
The
suspect
used
a large black
police-type
flashlight during the commission of the offenses.

i- -> \ i *

r V.M.

^^^7

.n

r\ n J\ :\ n. > i

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items:
(X) in the day time.

SUESCRIEED AKD SWORN TO EEFORE ME this ^ ' d a y

of April, 1965

%(^k
JUDQE
IK TH"E FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, IN AKD
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^t^rSStOKJ

1

i

A

That *s not i r u e .

|

Q

Nothing t h a t ' s

!
2
3{

this affidavit,

articulated

within

t h e body of

is t h e r e ?

4 I
5

!

A

W e had a c a s e

filed

Q

If you'll a n s w e r m y q u e s t i o n .

!
;

that w e - Is there

anything

c j

7

I listed w i t h i n
you would

8
9

J m a y have
| Johnson

the b o d y of this

have

independently

told y o u , e v e n
told

affidavit

corroborated

though we don't

which

states

that

what

Virgil

Johnson

k n o w what

Virgil

you?

i
10

11

!

12

A

You're a s k i n g me is m y i n d e p e n d e n t

Q

I'm asking y o u what

is s t a t e d

13

anything stated w i t h i n

14

Johnson m a y have told y o u , w h a t e v e r
A

15

Q

It d o e s n ' t

in h e r e .

t h a t , that c o r r o b o r a t e s

state

that

:: Your^repoi^^na±ca^

corroboration--

what

in t h o s e w o r d s , n o .

describ^edj;the - i n t e r ^

17

covers-vor ^portions ~of -cushions r^jLsiif t that -right?
A

Correct.

19

Q

The i n t e r i o r

20

have o r a n g e

21

A

22
23

Q

of M r . B a b b e l l ' s

i
j

t r u c k does not

inside of i t , d o e s it?
Y e s , it d o e s .
MS. WELLS:

|

Virgil

that m a y be?

16

18

Is there

May I have

(By Ms. Wells)

those

pictures

back.

Mr. Cazier, I'm asking you to

24

look at Defendant's Exhibit D-3. What color do you see

25

in there?

Isn't it yellow?

51

[HI 'TTTFT:

.1^.1 ::::.;.

Tiu ran proceed.

|

i

5I
6:
7

T

; By "r. Vuyk )

;

.-.

:es.

i

1-

Frhe rerremberea it was a four-wheel drive

.

i

Tell re what she said about the interior.
_

;

.

£ha described :r.e interior in some detail.

1

$ \

!

WCU1.G

y-': •-::, ;s vha: she told you about -he vehicle itself?

3 I w-*:h n ~ ^urrceTr:
9

Thank you, Tour Honor.

!

Sh^.Tr:eoariedythat; the^frdhTt^seat was'.what s n ^

i

M ' referred tolas'-orange-spongy -'material. .She described Ttwo

:

12 j dr^Tc^TfioTder^^

I

She

• 3 i rerrerr.be r ?d— - h e d e s c r i b e d

the s h i f t i n g

arranaement.

I
14

"

It

,

|

i

< was r.n automatiJ wit* a four-wheel drive shifter on tne

\

|

!

15

| flour. She recalled a oroken windshield on the passenger's j
16
| side. She described a button tnat was mounted on the
':

I

•' \ a n v e r ' s viscr .
,3
!
Q
What iii that button say?
•

13
AJ

!

lid she say?

"

I
A
' butter.,

She s e a t e d

it

i

was a 30 r u l e s p e r h o u r s u c k s

!

i
l

21

]

T

What did sne say about :.VJ interior?

22

I

A

She indicated it was quite cluttered.

«
There

i

i

*3 I were scr-.e beer cans in it, ;ust in general disarray.
24 |
I
25

I

nv: luna e l s e
A

'."^11

••:ithr;.t

j

you c^n rettemoer i
reierrmo

10 t h e n o t e s ,

that's

2°-7

MS. WELLS:

That's ail I have.

THE COURT:

-.nytnmg further, Mr. Vuyk?

MS. WELLS:

Oh, Z thcugnt of one, I'm sorry.

THE COURT:

Go anead.

(By Ms. Wei is)

Q

Regarding the button that you

have described , you took Ms. Sine's recorded statement,
didn 1t you?
A

Yes , I did.

Q

All right.

And have you had an opportunity to

review that statement?
A

Yes.

Q

Nowhere in that statement did she ever describe

a^55 mines'per'hour sucks button, did she, when asked to
describe ' the^interior of the truck?
A

No, it's not on the recorded statement.
MS. WELLS:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Vuyk?

MR. VUYK:

Just one or two questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. VUYK:
Q

Did Ms. Sine indicate to you at any time or in

your conversation that there was a 55 miles per hour sucks
button?
A

She did.

Q

Do you recall exactly when that was?

229

A

Today.

When I saw the button.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Q

Larry didn't say anything to you about that?

A

No.

No one said anything to you about it?

He }ust said, "Have you ever seen these

before", and I said, "Yes. Told him where they were."
Q

So,

though, you have said that on the day that

you were giving your recorded statement, you were giving
an accurate statement as ~you could concerning the description
of the person as well as the" truck,"" you left" this "out, ^didn,11
you?
A

I guess so.

Q

And - -it-didnJ-t~~you^didn f t ~_ remember i t ~whenJyou

gaveTyouiTrecorded
A

Q

statement"ftHTd~*you?

;N6';

And you"dicLn I t^remember l i t ItfherT^o'u Uere*"asked

t o give" d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t s ^of -the ^ t r u c k _ a t _ t h e ^pr^^iminary
h e a r i n g , did you?
A

No,

Q

Now, have you gotten to know Detective Cazier

fairly well through this incident?
A

Just 'cause he's been by me, that's—you know.

Q

Standing by you in the sense supportive and that

type of thing?
A

Yeah.

And he's the one who's, you know, took

169

A

That's correct .

Q

Now, officer, you made a report on the 19th of

April, did you not?
A
Q

Concerning this case?
Yes.

A

I'm sure I did.

Q

All right.

Let me show you what purports to

"be y6ur;report of April 19th.

Does that appear to'be your

^report, ^Officer?
A

Yes'7.•/•".!t...does .

Q

And it is dated April 19th,-.is it; not?

A

"Q
A

"It lis.
m

l V n d ^ r t ^ ~ ^ a ~ f o^uir^page - r e p o r t - ? - /

Yes.

Q

It looks to be a detailed report, does it not?

A

rl-T^would'TjcalT'^it :detailed/ yes ^

Q

Have you had an opportunity to review this report

before coming in today?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

So you are familiar with -its contents, correct?

A
Q

Yes.
And in preparing this report, you attempted to

be as detailed and accurate as possible, did you not?
A

With the information available at that.time,

yes.

n -> i

1

Q

2

And in this report, Detective Cazier, there is

no mention of any 55 miles per hour sucks button, is there?

3

A

That's correct.

4

Q

In this report ycu write the description given

5

oy Karen Sine of the person //no assaulted her as being a

6

person without any mustache; isn't that true?

7

'

8
9

A

That's correct.

Q

And in that -report you describe the description

given to you of the interior of the truck not "as having

10

orangeTseats , right?

11

A

12|

Q

I
13 |
I

14 !

tfell-You don't describe it as having-orange seats,

fioryou?
A

Well/^let ^sjcompare "'reports:

15 i

Q

If you'll -look at-Page 4 *of your ^report.

16

A

IJ^m±on Page^4_v

17

Q

On the third paragraph approximately the ^seventh

I

line 'down , you've described tnere what^ her description'of
191

the interior of that truck looks like, don't you?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And there you don'tsay anything about orange

22

seat ^covers, do you?

23

»

A

No.

24

'

Q

And you don't say anything about white s e a t —

25

She said what--

you do say something about white seat covers?

1
2

I
;

3;

5
6

A

That's correct.

Q

And you don't say anything about yellow, seat

covers at all, do you?

;

A

It says white.

S

Q

Now, you executed a search warrant in Mr,

! 3abbeil!s home and of the truck; is that right--

7

I

A

Yes.

I
i

8

I

9 '
10

Q

--as you've described?

also

told you that this p a r t i c u l a r t r u c k had s i d e mirrors on

A

Y e s , she

12

Q

All right.

did.
That

hasn't

been

included

in any

of your aescriptions today, has it?

14 i

A

Not so

15

Q

Not

far.

in r e s p o n s e

to c o u n s e l ' s

q u e s t i o n to you

16

about what your recollection might have been about her

17

descript:ions, c o r r e c t ?

18

A

My

19

Q

A l l right .

independent

recollection, yes.

;

Y o u ;have;-;no ;side^rnirrors-^tO; pr^esen^

20

today^as e v i d e n c e h a v i n g .been f o u n d at_Mrr^Babbelljjs^house,

21

do_you?
• sr-Ji-

•••

22

A

No-;~zl .idp.inpt. .•

23

Q

You # xlon ' t _ h a v e _ a n y . spotlights v ; to"'present :as

24
25

I

it, didn' t she?

11

13

Now, Karen Sine

e v i d e n c e J: od ay , 1. d o'; y o u ?

TNo, il do'not.

223

1

!

Q

You don't have any drink holders to present as ,

2! evidence, do you?
3:

A

Not 'the holders themselves , no.-

!

Q

You don't have any, any beer bottles, do you?

5

J

A

It' s '"fairly obvious'"'1 d o n 1 1 haveTbeer bottles .

6

!
Q
Just as I ask you each question, please respond.
i
s You don't have any-|

7

8i

!
y
!

A

T h a t ' s my r e s p o n s e ,

counselor.

Q

You d o n 1 1 . h a v e any.cassette tapes to present,

10 I do ;you?
i
11
A

No7 'I do" not.

12

You d o , however, have a tee-shirt which you have

13

Q

described, "correct?

14

A

15

Q

16

Yes.
You've described Karen Sine as saying that this--

her assailant was a large framed individual, correct?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

Would you please look at that tee-shirt and tell

19
20
21

me what size that is?
A

Well, it's got an M on it.

If you'll allow me

an assumption, I would say it's medium.

22

Q

23

framed man?

24

A

25

Q

Do you think a medium tee-shirt will fit a large

Yes.
Mr. 3abbell, would you stand, please take off

??4

A

Virgil Johnson, Detective Skogg, and Sargent

Carlson, and I believe there's one other, but I don't recall
who it was or anything.
Q

Now, when you went there with that search warrant,

did you have an opportunity to review the inside of the
truck?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And were you p r e s e n t when p i c t u r e s were taken?

A

Yes.

Q

Who took, those pictures?

A

I had Officer Bruce Clemins.

Q

Ifm going to show you what's been marked as

State ' s "Exhibit "S^TT^TS^l', -s-4T "and ask you if you recognize
those?
A

Yes.

These are the pictures of the vehicle that

were taken at the time we executed the search warrant.
Q

Now, when you executed the search warrant, were

there license plates on that car?
A

Yes.

There was one.

That's depicted in the

photograph on State's Exhibit S-l which is mounted on the
left rear of the truck.
Q

Were there any license plates on the front of

the truck?
A

There were not.

Q

Now, I'm going to show you what's been marked
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•vhat inv -.".^cc lie ~M: ion

or

C

--'ha4: ^'i:-=e did

A

She

]

: he

truck,

a rpare

r

some

auxiliary

Old

she

the truck

: -ems thai w e r e

in the bed of the

t i r e , sone

Q

she say about

:escncec

and a e e r i e r , drink

the

is.

trucK, those

gas t a n k s , s p a r e

itself?

in the
items
gas

back
being

cans,

cooler.
indicate

anything

about

the color

of

truck?
A

it was a

Yes.
light
MS.

It was

her

c o l o r , that
T

.\-£LLS:

impression

at the time

that

she d i d n ' t - -

Objection.

The question

has

been

answered .
Q

'By M r . V u y k )
IPJE COURT..

Q

[By

A

'\ithout

Anything

else?

Sustained.

Mr. Vuyk)

--that

referring

she

said

about

the

to the n o t e s , that's

tr^ck?

my

r e c o 11 ec t ion >
Q

"•:;•/. did

she also d e s c r i b e

A

She d i d .

Q

Van you tell me what

the

individual

to

you?

her d e s c r i p t i o n was as

oest

vou reca 11?
A

Yes.

She d e s c r i b e d

frame., O'itk hair with
described

him as b e i n g

giasses , fairly

thick

a tattoo on his arm, d e s c r i b e d

quite

large

glasses.

She

his c l o t h i n g , a

?03

A

No.

Q

Was it light when you started walking down the

canyon?
A

Yeah.

Q

Do you have any notion of when approximately

you would have called your husband, what the time was?
A

He was already at work, and he gets to work at

8:00, so I don't know.

About 8:30 or so.

I don't know.

Q

So somewhere between 8:00 and 8:30?

A

Yeah.

Q

And it took you approximately two hours to walk

A -

Yeah.

Q

Yesterday, Karen, I believe you described the

down?
I guess.

_ _ _ _ _ _

inside of the car as being very dirty and messy, i-s that
right?
A

Yes.

Q

And Cyoii " d e s c r i b e d " i t ^ a s T having'fdririkTholders

insideT^is^thcitf^xight?
A

Yes.

Q

And you described jaight-track -tapes as being

around?
A

Cassettes.

Q

Cassettes,

I'm so_~ry.

C a s s e t t e t a p e s as being

around?
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1

A

Yes,

Q

And beer bottles on the floor?

3

A

Yes,

4

Q

And although you didn't mention it yesterday,

2

I

5

J haven't you previously indicated that the truck that you

6

J were in had some sort of a cord hanging down?

7
8

I

9

A

Yes.

Q

Now, let me show you again what f s been marked

as State's Exhibit S-3.' Do you remember seeing that picture

10

yesterday?

" I

A

12

Q

13

Yes.
Now, in that picture, you.don11 .see any cassette

jtype tapes^,^do you?

14

A

15

Q

You^ do^t^seerTany"Tcir ink ^holders , ^do_you?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Don*1 tTsee^ny^cdrd ~of ^any .type" hanging idown,,

18

"TNo.-

.do you?

19

A

No.

20

Q

You don't see any beer bottles, do you?

21

A

No.

22
23

MS. WELLS:
Exhibit

S-3 b e e n

Thank y o u .

Your H o n o r , h a s

State's

introduced?

24

THE COURT:

I don't

think it

25

MR. VUYK:

I haven't

offered

was.
any of t h e

pictures

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And you recall that you identified that picture

3

as looking like, or in fact, being the truck that you saw

4

on the morning of the 17th and you were riding in it?

5

A

It looked like the boxes in the back.

6

Q

So you 1 re not identify the truck itself, but

7

you're l o o k i n g — y o u ' re referring to what appears to be' boxes

8

in the back?

9

A

Yeah.

10

Q

Is that correct?

11

you've

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Now, in that particular picture, State's 13,

14

Though, that's the picture

identified?

there is no license plate shown in that picture, is there?

15

A

No.

1

Q

And is that because the picture itself would

6 I

17

cut off any license plate if it were there?

18

MR. VUYK:

19

Honor.

20

been cut off.

21
22

23

That's conjecture, Your

She has no information as to when it might have

THE COURT:
Q

I object.

Sustained.

(By M s . Wells)

Looking at the picture, can you

see the rear end of the truck?

24

A

Not the very end.

25

Q

All r i g h t .

Let me, t h e n , show you w h a t ' s been
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Dear Ms. Wells:
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27 February 1993

Mr. Geoffrey Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re; Babbel v# Holden, 930091

IIAQ

9 1993

**
CLERK SUFHt ME C0UR5,
UTAH

Dear Mr. Butler,
I am writing to invite the Court to review it's decision in the
matter of Utah v. Faston, 910266, as it applies to the petition
for Writ of Certiorari now before it.
Thank you for your time and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely your's

William F. Babbel
,1/1

Mixi a M?
/7

cc. Kenneth Bronston
Asst1 Utah Atty Gen.

